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Andrew Richman
Finding The Perfect Balance: Combating Cyber Attacks Without Intruding on Civil
Liberties
Part I: Introduction
The time has passed where the only threat to the United States and its people are that of
physical combat. A new war is being waged all around us today, the Cyber War. Over the last
decade, an influx of cyber hacking attacks has hit US government agencies, businesses and
individuals.1 These attacks are threatening the way both the government and businesses use the
Internet and store their private information.2 Cyber attacks have resulted in many companies and
individuals throughout the United States calling for new security protocols, and legislative
intervention to help combat this issue.3 With lawmakers’ adamant to help secure both
government and business’ digital security, doing so may come at a privacy cost for individuals
who use the Internet everyday.4
After more than five years of attempting to provide government regulations to combat
cyber security concerns, Congress has made its final push.5 While companion bills were
introduced and passed in 2015 respectively in both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
legislatures have been obstinate to secure a system in which a new government intermediary will
help field threats from private entities, and facilitate warnings to other potential victims.6 This
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information-sharing platform is believed to open up means of communication between private
entities and the government, helping each combat such attacks, as well as provide government
agencies with information necessary to help catch and persecute such attackers.7
Legislators finally achieved this goal in December 2015.8 The Cybersecurity Act of 2015
(CSA) was inserted “into a must-pass Omnibus [spending bill] at the 11th hour, without
debate.”9 Fearing an impending government shutdown, President Obama was obliged to sign the
two thousand plus page spending package that funds the government through September 2016.10
This has secured the highly controversial Cybersecurity Act of 2015, a place in United States
law.11 Little is known about what long-term effects this hidden bill could have, but on initial
inspection, it seems as if it will do more harm than good for the people of the United States.12
It is inevitable for a bill like this to be scrutinized harshly, just a few years following the
release of thousands of National Security Administration (NSA) documents. However, the
opponents to this bill may have a serious reason to be speaking out against it.13 This bill seems to
have been drafted broadly, tending to make the bill not only one for cyber security, but for cyber
surveillance.14

Attacks (January 28, 2015), available at https://d1ovv0c9tw0h0c.cloudfront.net/files/2015/01/HSGAC-Cybersectes-1-28-15-final-TEH.pdf
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Id.
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Tom Risen, Obama Signs Cybersecurity Law In Spending Package, U.S. NEWS, December 18, 2015, available at
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015-12-18/obama-signs-cybersecurity-law-in-spending-package.
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Id.
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Velazco, supra note 5.
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Robyn Greene, The Protecting Cyber Networks Act: Undermines Privacy, Enables Cyber-Surveillance, and
Threatens Internet Security, OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, (April 20, 2015), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/theprotecting-cyber-networks-act/
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Opposition Letter to Representatives, Civil Society Organizations, (April 20, 2015),
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2885-coalition-letter-from-55-civil-society-groups-security-experts-andacademics-opposingpcna/Coaltion%20Letter%20Strongly%20Opposing%20PCNA.b24d1869025848cb96385603d8208dea.pdf
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The overly broad language of the CSA may result in companies to significantly expand
monitoring of their users information and permit sharing to the federal government of private
user information that would otherwise be illegal under previous cyber bills.15 Additionally, the
bill requires federal entities to automatically distribute this user information to other agencies,
like the NSA, and authorizes law enforcement to use this to investigate any threats of crime that
they may find.16
While it is necessary to help combat cyber criminals that threaten the foundation of the
modern technological era, it is of greater concern to protect the privacy interests granted to
individuals in the United States. Part II of this Note will provide a history of cyber attacks and
the road that was taken to get to the CSA. Part III will provide an analysis of how the passing of
the CSA will result in the undermining of the Electronic Communications Protections Act
(ECPA), and could potentially invoke constitutional issues within the Fourth Amendment. Part
IV will argue for an amending of such legislation that will narrow the scope of the bill to
encompass that which the bill intends to cover, only cyber security.
Part II: The Road To The CSA
The last decade has seen an unprecedented increase in the number of cyber attacks
throughout the world.17 As technology advances, and cyber defense measures improve, cyber
criminals and their offensive tactics change.18 What started as mild disruptions by pranksters
installing worms and viruses on basic computers has evolved into malware codes that can spread

Jadzia Butler, Cybersecurity Information Sharing In the “Omnious” Budget Bill: A Setback for Privacy, CDT,
(December 17, 2015) https://cdt.org/blog/cybersecurity-information-sharing-in-the-ominous-budget-bill-a-setbackfor-privacy/
16
Risen, supra note 8.
17
NATO, Cyber Security Infographic, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/Cyber-Security-inFocus/EN/index.htm
18
Gregory Webb, Evolution of Cyber Attacks Infographic, VENAFI, (August 21, 2013),
https://www.venafi.com/blog/post/evolution-of-cyber-attacks-infographic/
15
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throughout entire networks of company computers.19 Hacking has become a profession, and with
an increase of malicious targeting of businesses and government agencies, the stakes have been
raised.20 Reasons for the attacks differ, from anarchist groups such as Anonymous, to college
students just trying to get an extra buck, the results are the same, secrets are leaked and money is
lost.21
The history of cyber attacks dates back to the late 1980s, when the first computer worm
was created.22 This virus, generated by Robert Morris, “was the first widespread instance of a
denial-of-service (DoS) attack.”23 While the Internet was still developing into what it would
become today, the “Morris Worm” laid the foundation for future hackers to follow.24 This worm
would also gain the attention of Congress, as they passed the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA), which made certain cyber crimes a felony offense.25 But computer hacks at this
point were nothing more than an annoyance, and a hobby for computer fanatics.26
As the personal computer began to integrate into the average American family household,
from 22.9 percent of households owning one in 1993 to 61.8 percent of households in 2003,
hackers began to realize the potential damage they could cause and the rewards they could
quickly reap.27 Most importantly, the Internet began to grow in popularity and the information

19

Id.
Id.
21
See generally Andy Greenberg, Google’s Three Tips For Sabotaging the Cybercrime Economy, WIRED
MAGAZINE, September 24, 2015, available at http://www.wired.com/2015/09/google-offers-3-lessons-cripplingonline-crime-economy/?mbid=social_fb
22
Ted Julian, Defining Moments in the History of Cyber-Security and the Rise of Incident Response, INFOSECURITYMAGAZINE, December 4, 2014, http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/opinions/the-history-of-cybersecurity/
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Florida Tech University Alliance, A Brief History of Cyber Crime,
http://www.floridatechonline.com/resources/cybersecurity-information-assurance/a-brief-history-of-cyber-crime/
26
Webb, supra note 18.
27
Statista, Percentage of Households With a Computer At Home From 1984 to 2010,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/184685/percentage-of-households-with-computer-in-the-united-states-since-1984/;
See generally Webb, supra note 18.
20
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average people and homeowners began to share over the World Wide Web would soon create a
new black market for hackers.28
As quoted by internationally known hacker, Space Rogue, “[t]he web changed [things],
putting stuff at everyone’s fingertips. Money became the driving force behind the hacks.”29 The
world began to run on computers, from “the stock market, to hospitals, and credit card
transactions” and before the risk was assessed, hackers would make these businesses and
innocent individuals pay.30 The early 2000s would see a sharp increase in attacks, ranging from
malicious spam malware to steal login credentials, to DoS attacks on Microsoft, affecting
hundreds of thousands of computer users.31 Federal entities were so slow to target and catch
these cyber criminals, that in 2003 Microsoft offered five million dollars for information that
would help lead to arrests of hackers affecting their operating system.32
The Internet age would be flipped upside down in 2007 when Albert Gonzalez, a young
hacking mastermind, and his criminal enterprise, revealed to have stolen over 180 million credit
card accounts from TJX, the company which owned Target, Home Depot and many more.33
While working simultaneously for the Secret Service, he and his affiliates inflicted damage to the
company that would total more than four hundred million dollars over a two-year period.34 This
put governments and businesses on full watch, as the world now could see the true damage that
cyber criminals could cause.35

28

Jose Pagliery, The Evolution of Hacking, CNN, June 4, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/11/tech/computerhacking-history/
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Paul R. La Monica, Microsoft: Bounty Hunter, CNN MONEY, November 5, 2003,
http://money.cnn.com/2003/11/05/technology/microsoftbounty/
33
James Verini, The Great Cyberheist, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, November 10, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/magazine/14Hacker-t.html?_r=0
34
Id.
35
Id.
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Things worsened over the next few years and into today.36 As new hacking groups and
criminal organizations have formed and flourished, the rate and cost to major companies, has
increased substantially.37 Just in 2014, attacks occurred against companies such as Sony Pictures,
Home Depot, and JP Morgan.38 The JP Morgan breach “affected more than 76 million
households and seven million small businesses,” thus deemed the biggest hack of consumer data
in United States history.39 Estimates figure that the “annual cost to the global economy from
cybercrime is more than $400 billion.”40
The effects of a cyber attack go far beyond that of money and the bottom line.41 As
countries become more dependent on technology, “the threat posed by any one cyber attack can
have devastating effects around the world.”42 Money is not the only worry, as cyber attacks have
been carried out by multiple nations such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, lives could be
threatened.43 The potential exists that an attack could “cause physical destruction” and a “cyber
Pearl Harbor” with a single keystroke.44 The United States government is just as prone, as in
2014 alone there were over 67,000 cyber attacks on federal agencies.45 This is compared to only
5,500 in 2006, an increase of over 1,100 percent in fewer than ten years.46
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Pagliery, supra note 28.
Webb, supra note 18.
38
Nojeim, supra note 6.
39
Press Release, Office of Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Opens New Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center, (October 30, 2009),
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1256914923094.shtm
40
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ness Losses: Estimating the Global Cos of Cybercrime, June 2014,
available at http://csis.org/files/attachments/140609_rp_economic_impact_cybercrime_report.pdf
41
Andrew Nolan, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43941, CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATION SHARING: LEGAL
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS, (2015), at 2.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Leon E. Panetta, Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Def., Remarks on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives For National
Security (October 11, 2012)
45
Andrea Peterson, This Terrifying Chart Explains Why Cybersecurity is Such a Big Problem For The Government,
THE WASHINGTON POST, (June 18, 2015), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2015/06/18/this-terrifying-chart-explains-why-cybersecurity-is-such-a-big-problem-for-the-government/
46
Id.
37
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Today, to understand the sharing aspect of the CSA, it is important to discern how
exactly companies and entities monitor, combat and subsequently share cyber threats. Most
entities use cyber security providers, who deliver “signatures” to help combat malicious cyber
activity.47 These signatures are “specific machine readable patterns of network traffic that affect
the integrity, confidentiality or availability of computer networks, systems and information.”48
They report back specific cyber threat indicators, which hackers store within IP addresses,
domains, emails, and files in which the signature can read.49
The occurrence and complexity of these attacks increase each year, as hackers become
more adept to the changing signature scans and other attempts of both the government and
private companies to gain the upper hand.50 Previously, over 75 percent of perceived threats were
made using basic spam, which could be prevented quite easily.51 Today, that basic form of cyber
warfare has fallen to 42 percent, while malware and phishing are perceived to be 59 percent and
57 percent of current threats respectively, which result in much larger and undetected data
breaches.52 The success of these criminals has risen as well, as the number of successful attacks
has increased by 144 percent in the last five years and the time spent for both agencies and
companies to combat such attacks has increased by 221 percent.53 These numbers are shocking,
and it is apparent that some action must be taken to help combat this issue.

47

Michael Daniel, White House Cybersecurity Coordinator, 007 or DDoS: What is Real World Cyber? at the RSA
Conference (February 28, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-0228_final_rsa_speech.pdf
48
DOUGLAS LOVELACE, TERRORISM: COMMENTARY ON SECURITY DOCUMENTS: THE CYBER THREAT 23 (Oxford
University Press, Volume 140, 2015)
49
Id.
50
Steinhauer, supra note 2.
51
CYBER SECURITY AND TRANSFORMATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES: KEEPING SYSTEMS AND DATA SAFE 4 (The Lockheed
Martin Cyber Security Alliance, 2012) available at
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/isgs/documents/LM-Cyber-Security-TransformationalTechnologies.pdf
52
Id at 6.
53
Steinhauer, supra note 2.
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B. Unsuccessful Attempts at Securing Cyber Networks
Following attacks on the Pentagon, Department of Defense, NASA, and major US
banking institutions, legislators proposed an information sharing system called the Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) in 2011.54 The bill was the origin of the current
CSA, and proposed a way for the government and private companies to share data
instantaneously without the need for court orders.55 The bill passed through the House of
Representatives by a vote of 248 to 168, but did not make it much farther, as adversaries began
speaking out against the bill.56 A year after its dissolution, in early 2013, the bill was proposed to
the House of Representatives in an identical form.57
This bill and the encompassing cyber security measures seemed to have a positive
outlook for legislators, as President Obama even signed an executive order “setting forth a
proposed program to support the cyber security efforts of privately owned [businesses].”58 After
the release of thousands of sensitive government documents from whistleblower Edward
Snowden, things quickly changed.59 With government snooping and privacy fears at the
forefront of US minds, CISPA was slowly dismembered, as privacy opponents cited a few major
flaws with the bill, which are similar to the ones that plague CSA today.60
One of CISPA’s major defects was its definition of “cyber threat information.”61 “Cyber
threat information” was defined as “intelligence in the possession of an element of” anyone

NATO, The History of Cyber Attacks – a Timeline, available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm
55
Mark Peckham, 5 Reasons the CISPA Cybersecurity Bill Should Be Tossed, Time Magazine Opinion, April 19,
2012, available at http://techland.time.com/2012/04/19/5-reasons-the-cispa-cybersecurity-bill-should-be-tossed/
56
Jay P. Kesan, Creating a Circle of Trust To Further Digital Privacy and Cybersecurity Goals, Mich. St. L. Rev.
1475, 1480, (2014)
57
Id. at 1480.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Butler, supra note 15.
61
Kesan, supra note 53 at 1501.
54
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outside the government intelligence community.62 This definition was very vague, opening the
door for countless interpretations of what included a “cyber threat.”63 CISPA was the first bill to
try to break down legal barriers between government entities and the private sector, as it could
expand the scope of what information they could receive.64 For example, “a company like
Google, Facebook, Twitter, or AT&T could intercept your emails and text messages, send copies
to one another and to the government, and modify those communications or prevent them from
reaching their destination if it fits into their plan to stop ‘cyber security’ threats.”65
This bill was so broad that the White House threatened to veto the bill if it reached
President Obama’s desk.66 The White House believed that CISPA “still seek[ed] additional
improvements and if the bill, as currently crafted, were presented to the President, his senior
advisors would recommend that he veto the bill.”67 This seemed to be the final blow to CISPA,
as the Administration stated that they “remain[ed] concerned that the bill does not require private
entities to take reasonable steps to remove irrelevant personal information when sending cyber
security data to the government or other private sector entities.”68 While the bill lost its steam,
due to the aforementioned Snowden leaks, the Obama Administration did seem to have their
sights set on an information-sharing platform in the near future, once the publicity surrounding
government privacy concerns started to subside.69
C. The Revival of Information Sharing and an Overview of the CSA

62

Id. at 1495.
Peckham, supra note 52.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Executive Office Of The President, Statement of Administration Policy (April 26, 2013), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saphr624r_20130416.pdf
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Steven Dennis, Obama Pushes for Deals on Cybersecurity, Trade, Taxes, (January 13, 2015), available at
http://blogs.rollcall.com/white-house/obama-meeting-with-top-congressional-leaders-without-harry-reid/? pos=adpb
63
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While CISPA died in its tracks in 2013, this information-sharing platform has
continuously been lauded as a necessary means to help protect private entities and government
agencies against the threat of hackers.70 Some proponents argue that the “receipt of critical threat
data can and has been shown to prevent potential cyber attacks and mitigate ongoing threats.”71
The “one point of general agreement amongst cyber-analysts is the perceived need for enhanced
and timely exchange of cyber-threat intelligence.”72
Recently, the Senate and House legislators reevaluated the deficiencies of the original
CISPA bill and revived it in early 2015.73 Similar bills were introduced and passed in both the
Senate and the House within 2015.74 The House version, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act
(PCNA), gained more steam than CISPA ever did, and even to many Democrats’ surprise, also
gained support with the White House.75 In the Senate, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
(CISA) entailed much of what was contained within the PCNA.76 While there existed many
overlaps between the two bills, they became the basis for the now in effect CSA.77 However it
seems many of the privacy protections, which were contained in the previous bills, have been
pushed aside.78
The CSA bill puts a recently developed agency, the National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (the Center), to develop the process in which private entities

70

Steinhauer, supra note 2.
Kimberly Peretti, Cyber Threat Intelligence: To Share or Not to Share—What Are the Real Concerns?, 13 PVLR
1476 (2014)
72
Nolan, supra note 41.
73
Greenberg, supra note 4.
74
Tom Risen, Cybersecurity Bill Passes In Senate, US News (October, 27, 2015), available at
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/27/opposition-mounts-as-cybersecurity-bill-goes-before-senate
75
Id.
76
Abigail Tracy, The Problems Experts And Privacy Advocates Have With The Senate’s Cybersecurity Bill, Forbes,
October 29, 2015, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/2015/10/29/the-problems-experts-andprivacy-advocates-have-with-the-senates-cybersecurity-bill/ (Outlining CISA and how it compares with PCNA)
77
Id.
78
Butler, supra note 15.
71
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will share information with the government.79 This Center has been established under the
umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which has already funded 1.2 billion
dollars to the Center as of 2014, with 800 million dollars set aside for cyber security programs.80
The CSA has four major flaws that worry privacy and civil liberty advocates.81 The first
issue is that the CSA provides an overarching authorization for companies to monitor their
networks for “cyber security purposes.”82 Second, the CSA authorizes companies to share a large
amount of their user information with the government and with one another, granted that the
shared information is a “cyber threat indicator,” which includes “information that is necessary to
describe or identify . . . any . . . attribute of a cyber security threat.”83 Next, it would allow
companies to disseminate this information with any government agency, and encourages it to
directly share with the newly established Center, but would require that information to also be
disseminated to other government agencies ranging from the FBI to the NSA.84 The CSA would
then allow any government agency that receives this information, to use it for investigation or
prosecution of any crimes that could result in “a specific threat of death, a specific threat of
serious bodily harm, or a specific threat of serious economic harm.”85
Part III: Analysis
A. Laws That Will Be Implicated By The CSA
The issues within the CSA may cross a multitude of legal lines.86 The CSA traverses into
territories of electronic privacy laws, most significantly being the Electronic Communications

79

H.R. Con. Res. 2029, 114th Cong., Division N Title II (2015) (enacted)
U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, S.2519, NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION
CENTER ACT OF 2014 COST ESTIMATE (2014), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45594
81
Butler, supra note 15; See generally Peretti, supra note 71.
82
H.R. Con. Res. 2029, 114th Cong., Division N Title I Sec. 102(4) (enacted)
83
H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Sec. 102(6)
84
H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Sec. 105(d)(A)
85
Id.
86
Pereitti, supra note 71.
80
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Privacy Act (ECPA). The CSA has also been alleged to overstep the government’s scope of a
permissible search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.87
The ECPA restricts the government’s use of wire tapping transmissions of electronic data
by a computer, prohibits access to stored electronic communications, and tracing of such.88 The
statute prohibits the disclosure or use of any contents of any electronic communication that was
obtained through an illegal interception.89 This includes providers who are able to monitor their
own networks, but are not permitted to release such information.90
The Fourth Amendment protects American citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures by government officials, and compliance with such requires a court warrant.91 This
protection only extends to individuals when there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”92
While it will take a multitude of court interpretations to figure out how far the CSA can extend, it
seems that it may violate the Fourth Amendment and have an impact over what information can
and cannot be shared by the new law.
B. The CSA Undermines the Current ECPA.
The first major issue is that the CSA authorizes companies to monitor all of their users’
activities, opening the door for unauthorized interception of private information.93 Right now, the
ECPA, the most in depth law that covers this area, prevents any person or entity to intercept any
electronic communication.94 To intercept, means to use “any electronic . . . device, to acquire the
contents or the substance . . . or meaning of the communication.”95 Furthermore, the ECPA

87

Id.
Id.
89
Electronic Communications and Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c)-(d) (1986)
90
Id.
91
U.S. Const. amend. IV
92
Id.
93
Butler, supra note 15.
94
18 UCS §2511 (2)(a)(i)
95
Id.
88
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prohibits the disclosure or use of the contents of any electronic communication that was obtained
in violation of the statue.96 With a general reading of this provision, this privacy law would seem
to be in conflict with the new CSA.
The ECPA has two exceptions that the CSA intends to work around.97 The exceptions
provide that information can be retrieved with authorization by “a party to the communication”
and allows companies to supervise their own networks for self-defense.98 The first exception has
already been trouble for courts, as it is difficult to determine in electronic communications, who
is exactly a “party to the communication.”99 During a DoS attack, any user on a network who has
opened a malicious file can be construed to fall under this definition of a “party to the
communication.”100
The second exception allows service providers to monitor their own systems with consent
of the user, in “the normal course of employment, while engaged in any activity which is a
necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of
the provider of that service.”101 This enables these providers to conduct some monitoring to
detect or defend against an attack after gaining consent of the individual, and may then disclose
such communications recovered.102 While there is one court who has disagreed, most courts have
determined that this exception can only be used with the purpose of protecting one’s own

96

18 U.S.C §2511(2)(ii)(B)
Id.
98
Id.; Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 297 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that for the consent exception to apply, the
consent must be one who is a party to the communication)
99
See generally Dep’t of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal
Investigations, (2009), www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf
100
Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2010)
101
18 U.S.C §2511(2)(a)(i)
102
Id.
97
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“equipment and rights.”103 Barring these exceptions, narrowly interpreted as courts have held,
the ECPA prevents any person or entity from intercepting and disclosing any other electronic
communications, protecting American’s privacy in the electronic realm.104
The CSA states that private entities can now “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law . . . for a cyber security purpose monitor any information system of such private entity . . .
[or] information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system monitored by
the private entity.”105 This appears the CSA gives private companies blanket permission to
monitor any traffic coming through its site, completely waiving the provisions of the Wiretap
Act and the ECPA.106 The language “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law” would
suggest that the CSA now trumps the ECPA, expanding the scope of ISP monitoring in ways far
beyond current law.107 This provision allows businesses and service providers to now monitor
all of its users, without a consensual agreement and not only to protect themselves.108 More
troublesome, is what these companies can do with the information that it collects.
Next, the CSA will enable these companies to take the overbroad security monitoring it
has been granted, and disseminate it to the Center, who will then distribute it to other
government organizations and private entities.109 The CSA defines something that can be shared
as “cyber threat indicators,” which means “information that is necessary to describe or identify . .
. any other attribute of a cyber security risk.”110 Again, directly contrary to the exact language of

103

United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a company could intercept electronic
communications to help protect its customers); Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979) (Held that
company could monitor and intercept calls as protection of its own equipment and rights)
104
18 U.S.C §2511 (1)
105
H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Sec. 104(a) (emphasis added).
106
Jennifer Granick, CISA Pits DHS Against the FCC and FTC on User Privacy, JUST SECURITY (December 16,
2015), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/28386/omnicisa-pits-government-against-self-privacy/
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.; H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Sec. 105(d)(A)
110
H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Sec. 102(6)
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the ECPA, which does not authorize service providers to ever disclose or divulge to private
entities or government personnel any contents of communications for the purpose of protecting a
third party.111 Courts have consistently held, that even if the provider is acting out of inherent
self-interest, in no way does the ECPA allow “unlimited” interceptions and then subsequent
disclosures of those unauthorized seizures.112 This issue was something that even the DHS itself
was wary about in the Senate version of the CSA back in August 2015, as Deputy Secretary of
the DHS stated,
[w]hile the [CISA] seeks to incentivize non-federal sharing through a DHS
portal, the bills authorization to share with any federal agency
“notwithstanding any other provision of law” undermines that policy goal . .
. . The authorization to share cyber threat indicators and defensive measures
with “any other entity or the Federal Government,” “notwithstanding any
other provision of law” could sweep away important privacy protections,
particularly the provisions in the [ECPA] limiting the disclosure of the content
of electronic communications to the government by certain providers.113

The way the CSA is written, can be construed very broadly, to often times include
information of a potentially innocent person.114 “Cyber threat indicators” in the new CSA, has
been expanded from its origin bills, to now include provisions to share information that describe
attributes of a cyber security threat and potential harms caused by an incident.115 This
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information may allow sharing of unnecessary Personally Identifiable Information (PII).116 PII
could include any sensitive information shared across the web, such as medical information,
Social Security Numbers, or financial information.117 For example, an innocent victim’s
computer may have been compromised by an unsuspecting hacker, and is now being accessed to
engage in malicious activity, such as spear phishing emails, without the user’s knowledge.118 The
service provider, or any company whose system this hacker reaches, can now share the IP
address not of the hacker but of this victim.119 This will release not only the private identity of
who the victim is, maybe even some PII of this innocent customer.120
While in the CSA’s defense they do encourage and require for a non-federal entity to
remove any personal identification that they find, these restrictions still seem to be overly
broad.121 The CSA provides that a non-Federal entity must “review [a] cyber threat indicator to
assess whether such cyber threat indicator contains any information not directly related to a
Cybersecurity threat the non-Federal entity knows at the time of sharing to be personal
information of a specific individual . . . and remove such information.”122 It can also implement a
technical process to search for such individual information.123
Yet, what is a non-Federal entity supposed to do when they do not “know at the time of
sharing” whether a cyber threat indicator contains personal information not “directly related” to
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such cyber threat indicator? According to the recent CSA guidelines that the DHS released, if a
non-Federal entity does not know at the time of sharing, “the non-federal entity is not required to
alter the shared information.”124 In the heat of the moment of a massive security breach, this
leaves the door open for entities to now claim that they simply did not know of any personal
information at the time of sharing, and ultimately circumvent the tedious, and possibly costly
option of searching for personal information.
This information is intended to be protected private information that the ECPA is sought
to safeguard. However the CSA now guards all non-Federal sharers, shielding them behind a veil
of liability protection.125 The CSA provides that “no cause of action shall . . . be maintained in
any court against any private entity . . . for the monitoring of an information system . . . that is
conducted in accordance with this title.”126 Combined with the fact that non-Federal entities
seem to be able to share the “kitchen sink,” as long as they “did not know” it contained personal
information, these same non-Federal entities now receive complete government protection for
committing such acts.127 All of this seems to eradicate the ECPA, resulting in far less protection
for individuals on their devices.128 The dissemination of this information, while illegal under the
ECPA, may have far greater consequences for individuals.
C. The CSA and the Fourth Amendment
The passing of the CSA has opened the door by privacy advocates of its potential Fourth
Amendment violations. These advocates suggest that because the CSA allows the federal
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government to use information contained within shared cyber security threats, to investigate or
prosecute individuals for crimes outside the scope of cyber crime, that individuals Fourth
Amendment rights are at stake.129 While this new government tool for prosecution does raise
concern, the CSA seems to be drafted perfectly to circumvent Fourth Amendment violations, as
they are presently interpreted.
The Fourth Amendment protects Americans against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”130 A “search” under the Fourth Amendment, specifically in the context of electronic
communication, takes place when the governments monitoring violates “an expectation of
privacy” that society considers reasonable.131 A seizure, in turn, occurs “when there is some
meaningful interference with an individuals interests” in their property.132 It seems that the CSA
could implicate the government on the search aspect of the Fourth Amendment, more so than the
seizure.
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that there was an expectation of privacy
in electronic telephone conversations.133 However, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
held that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed on telephone records.134 Finding where
the information shared in the CSA falls between these two expectations, will determine whether
such conduct could be considered a Fourth Amendment violation. However, an individual will
first have to show that a government actor conducted the invalid search.135

129

Robyn Green, Sharing At of 2015 Is Cyber-Surveillance, Not Cybersecurity, OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE
(April 9, 2015), available at https://www.newamerica.org/oti/cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-of-2015-iscyber-surveillance-not-cybersecurity/
130
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
131
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)
132
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)
133
Id.
134
442 U.S. 735 (1979)
135
Lizzy Finnegan, CISA and the War On Privacy, BREITBART (November 10, 2015), available at
http://www.breitbart.com/tech/2015/11/10/cisa-and-the-war-on-privacy/

19

The Fourth Amendment only protects an individual against the actions of the
government, not of individuals.136 For the private entities that share information under the CSA,
they will have to be regarded as an agent of the government in order for any individual to claim
that the search that has occurred, is in fact a Fourth Amendment violation.137 A search could be
treated as a government search, “if the government coerces, dominates, or directs the actions of a
private person.”138 Whether a private entity is considered an agent of the government,
“necessarily turns on the degree of the government’s participation in the private party’s
activities.”139 Many courts have employed a two-part totality of the circumstances test, which
states that the government had to know of and acquiesce the intrusive conduct, and then whether
the party performing the search intends to “assist law enforcement efforts or further his own
ends.”140
Using this test, one can analyze the conduct that will be taking place by private entities
under the CSA. First, it seems that the government not only knows of, but also is encouraging
businesses and private entities to engage in this monitoring and sharing of conduct. But, whether
private entities are engaging in this type of activity to assist law enforcement, or to further their
ends, is going to be an area of concern for courts in the time to come. On one side, these entities
will be sharing information about attacks, which have already occurred, meaning that their
interest in sharing this is limited, except to the extent of helping law officials find criminals. On
the other side entities will be sharing this information in real time, with the hope that the Center
has seen a similar cyber indicator, and can provide ways in which to stop it. While the former
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seems to suggest that these private entities could be acting simply to assist law enforcement, the
latter provides that they will be acting to further their own ends.
Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, an even bigger challenge to anyone bringing such
claim will rest in the fact that the government does not make sharing mandatory.141 The CSA
makes it clear that nothing within its title creates a duty for any one, to share anything.142 This
may weaken any individual’s argument that a private entity that is engaging in information
sharing is in fact a government agent.143 It has been held that, if a government agent “is involved
“merely as a witness,” the requisite government action is absent and the search will be deemed
private.”144 However, the argument can still be made, as the 10th Circuit has held, that conduct is
suspicious, and closer to a government actor, if a private search follows government
encouragement.145 Here, although the government is enticing private companies to share, the
companies will seemingly be engaging in this conduct to advance their own interests, to help
combat cyber attacks against them, improving their service to their customers.146 For these
reasons, the Fourth Amendment most likely will not be implicated.
If an individual can show that a private entity is determined to be a government actor in
terms of the CSA, the next question will be whether there is a search in which an expectation of
privacy exists.147 The CSA makes it clear that any of the government agencies that receive cyberthreat information, can then use the information to investigate or prosecute.148 The text of the bill
clearly states,

141

H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Section 106(e).
Id.
143
Souza, 223 F.3d at 1202.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Jeremy Broggi, Building on Executive Order 13,636 to Encourage Information Sharing For Cybersecurity
Purposes, 37 HARV. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 653, 662 (2014)
147
Id. at 663.
148
H.R. 2029, Division N Title I Sec. 105(d)(A)
142

21

Cyber threat indicators and defensive measures provided to the Federal
Government under this title may be disclosed to . . . any Federal agency,
department, component, officer, employee, or agent of the Federal
Government solely for (i) a cyber security purpose . . . (iii) the purpose of
responding to, or otherwise preventing or mitigating a specific threat of death,
a specific threat of serious bodily harm, or a specific threat of serious
economic harm . . . (v) [for] the purpose of preventing, investigating,
disrupting, or prosecuting an offense arising out of a threat described in clause
(iii).149
While problematic, it may not extend to private information that has been held to have an
expectation of privacy. It will ultimately come down to what type of personal information will
make it past the non-Federal entities doors, and into the hands of the government. Courts have
held that information conveyed to third parties, or information exposed to employees in their
ordinary course of business, does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.150 Information
such as email address names, email subject lines, websites visited, and amount of data
transferred all fall outside the scope of a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.151
However, if an individual’s email is compromised and malicious content is sent within an
email exchange between said individual and another, it is possible that this exchange could be
shared from the Internet provider, as a cyber security threat to the government. The government
could then be in possession of these emails, and if this exchange contained anything in reference
to bodily harm or death to someone, then the government could investigate or even prosecute
using these emails.152 Under United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit determined that a
“subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails “that are stored
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with, or sent or received through, a commercial [Internet Service Provider (ISP)].”153 This court
went further to state that the “government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the
contents of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”154
There are a number of possible PII or individuals information that may be sent to the Center in
the coming years, that could present a case in which a reasonable expectation of privacy has been
violated and a possible Fourth Amendment violation. Until then it will matter upon the
precaution these private entities take in scrubbing and protecting their customers’ private
information.
Finally, if an individual is successful in proving that the private entity should be
considered a government agent, and that they committed an invalid search by violating a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the government may still be able to argue for a Fourth
Amendment exception. The first, while brief, is a search conducted with consent. In this regard,
if these entities include or enable a consent form on their website or service that their information
is subject to such dissemination, maybe through a click-wrap agreement, then there would be no
expectation of privacy for such user.155
If no consent was acquired, then the government may still be able to argue a “special
needs” exception. If the government has a special need, it may eliminate the need for a warrant,
only if the government can show that the search is reasonable at its inception and it is reasonable
in scope.156 The courts will balance the intrusion on individuals with the benefit of such
warrantless searches to society.157 While the government says it has a need to protect its citizens
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form bodily harm or from death, it may not outweigh the intrusion on individuals, by being able
to look through protected emails. While the information sharing could fall under the “special
needs” doctrine, it would be specifically tailored to the details involving the initial cyber
attack.158 But a person who is being investigated through a CSA sharing, for an erroneous
suspicion of a cyber attack, could end up being charged with a completely unrelated crime during
the investigation.159 All in all, the broad language of the CSA while difficult may open the door
for Fourth Amendment challenges, as individuals’ personal information may be released to the
government through the sharing of private entities.

Part IV: Narrowing the Scope of the CSA
It is evident that some level of information sharing may be necessary when it comes to
preventing future cyber attacks and hacking. While it certainly will not end such conduct, it may
be a step in the right direction, granted this step is taken with privacy interests in mind. As the
CSA is currently construed however, this information sharing challenges the authority of the
ECPA, and could be a potential Fourth Amendment concern.160 The purpose of the CSA can be
achieved by a re-drafting to focus many aspects and provide for a narrower interpretation.
First, the definition of “cyber threat indicator” should be changed, removing the final two
subsections, F and G, which provide that a “cyber threat indicator” can be a description of actual
or potential harm caused by an incident, and “any other attribute of a Cybersecurity threat.”161
These two subsections are vague, and when drafting a bill that will enable such massive data
collecting, these definitions open the door for private entities to share more rather than share less.
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Next, the government hands the rights of the intermediary sharing system to that of a
third party civilian agency, rather than a military agency.162 As of now the CSA enables sharing
by a third party or the government, to any government entity, including the NSA. Putting the
responsibility of the intermediary in a private entities hands will stimulate more private
involvement and enable the civilian agency to double check and scan such information that has
been transmitted before releasing it to the government. Civilian agencies have recently had more
transparency, as intelligence agencies are far more opaque.163 The details about the scope and
nature of civilian agency activities are more narrowly defined and interpreted, resulting in more
understanding of what these agencies can and cannot do.164
This change will most likely encourage private entities that currently do not want to
participate in sharing, for fear of government data collecting, to actually engage in this process.
Many private entities have already publicly voiced their discontent with the CSA and the bills
that preceded it, stating their desire to protect their users and their own information.165 These
companies include Apple, Twitter, Yelp, Wikipedia and Reddit.166 After the Snowden leaks,
mass collections by the government have resulted in little trust, that could be restored by having
a third party intermediary.167 While important cyber security information can still be shared in
real time with the government, it would be beneficial to all parties to have it conducted through a
non-governmental entity.
Additionally, even if a third party would be collecting this data, the bill needs to require
that PII should be removed prior to sharing unless “it is necessary to identify or protect against a
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threat.”168 As mentioned earlier, the CSA mandates the removal of PII, as long as the entity
knows it isn’t directly related to the threat, and if they are unsure, they are allowed to share it. 169
Changing this standard could greatly affect the bill, by limiting the scope of private entities
ability to disseminate personal information. Further, the same standard should be adopted for the
Center and the DHS. As of now, the Center has to destruct PII if it’s known that the information
isn’t directly related to a threat. This new Center should only disseminate when it is necessary to
block significant threats to national security.170
Finally, and most importantly, the Government should only be able to prosecute and
arrest, for cyber security purposes, cyber criminals within the statute. Allowing the government
to use information received through this cyber security bill to investigate non-computer crimes,
changes the purpose of such bill. While it is important to stop crimes of serious bodily harm and
death, it seems it can be achieved in ways that do not include mass data collection and sharing.
This change would also seem to limit most potential violations that could arise of the Fourth
Amendment.
Part IV: Conclusion
This Note puts forth the position that the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, currently
undermines and violates the ECPA privacy laws, and raises potential Fourth Amendment
violations. Cyber attacks are on a steady and violent rise, and have already resulted in a loss of
billions of dollars for both the government and industries, making it is necessary to combat this
problem, but it must be so without intruding into the civil liberties of the people of the United
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States. This can be achieved through a narrower drafting of this legislation or new ideas, such as
a third party intermediary.
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